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THE CALIPHATE* 
THE Caliphate is the symbol of the traditionally and 
theoretically essential and necessary political unity of the 
Moslem world. The religious observances of Moslems- 
their daily worship, fasting in Ramadan, pilgrimage, etc.- 
may symbolize theirreligious unity; but the business of the 
Caliph is the administration of the affairs of their world in 
the widest sense, and the conception of his office looks back 
to a time in the remote past when these duties were really 
carried out and forward to a time in the millennia1 future 
when the carrying out of these duties will again be possible. 
A t  the present time, therefore, to call any one a Caliph 
means to assert his right to administer politically the 
affairs of the Moslem world. A Caliph, consequently, is 
to be sharply distinguished from a Pope, with whose office 
his is too often confused, in that he, first, is only an exec- 
utive and has no right to develop or define what is of 
faith for Moslems-that is done by the Moslem people 
through their “ agreement”-and, secondly, his executive 
functions cover all sides of life, political, legal, re1igious.t 
The interest, therefore, of the present situation lies in this 
question: Will the Caliph of the future continue to main- 
tain this claim to the headship of a politically unified 
Islam, and will Islam continue to feel itself a political 
unity over against the non-Moslem world, or will the 
principle of nationality prevail among the Moslem peoples 
as it has elsewhere and their Caliphate become merely a 
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m e  theory of the Caliphate has been repeatedly treated by Moslem theologians and 
canonists. Two such treatments exist in translation. One of these is Uon Ostrorog’s 
“Trait4 de h i t  public muaulmn” (Paris. 1901). a translation of the “Ahkam as-sul- 
taniya” of Mawardi, Vol. I..pp. 89-195, and the other is De Slane’s translation of “Les 
hl&om&nes d‘Ibn Khaldoun” (Paris, 186S), Vol. I, pp. SM-444. These supplement 
one another very happily. 
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symbol of religious unity? Caliph is the title used here as 
the one most commonly known with us; but Moslenis use 
in its place, as often as not, Amir al-mu’minin, “Com- 
mander of the Faithful,” and even Imim, “Leader,” 
taking that word in its highest sense. These three are 
practically interchangeable. 
The status, duties, and rights of a Caliph are made most 
intelligible by the early historical development. The 
theory of the Caliphate, too, is based upon the precedents 
then established and upon a few sayings which, though 
put into the mouth of Mohammed, were really forged to 
support one political party or another. Mohammed a t  
Medina had administered directly all the affairs of his 
people; he had been, like Moses and the Hebrew Judges, 
their individual and absolute ruler and judge. As 
Prophet, he had also been a first-hand source of faith and 
law; dogmas and legal rulings he could produce at need. 
This position of his was strictly in accordance with Arab, 
and indeed Semitic, ideas. To the authority, in a sense 
shading into aucforitas, of an Arab chief over his tribe he 
had added the infallibility of a prophet and the unifying and 
arousing force of a new idea-Islam. When he died, then, 
his position had to he filled, so far as that was possible. 
Of his four immediate “ successors” (Khalija, Caliph, 
means “ successor”)-the only ones recognized by all 
Islam-the first, the third, and the fourth were chosen by 
elective councils and in rapidly increasing political tur- 
moil, and the second was nominated by the first. 
It was thus fixed for the Moslem world, at least for that 
large portion of it which is called Sunnite, that its head 
should be freely elected by the people or nominated by his 
predecessor, and then accepted by the people. I n  theory, 
therefore, the power is of the people functioning as a free 
democracy, but the people chooses to be governed by a 
single individual who is then given absolute power and is 
to be obeyed implicitly as long as he breaks no essential 
law of Islam; if he does, he may be recalled by the people 
which appointed him. He appears, externally, to be an 
autocrat, but is not, and the people always retains the 
sacred right of insurrection. It isa disputed point whether 
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tyranny and personal immorality are valid grounds for 
recall. One school of constitutional law so holds, but 
another teaches that so long as the Caliph is a Moslem and 
an effective ruler he must be obeyed. Into the further 
details as to whether tyranny or immorality deprives him 
of his office ips0 fucto, or whether he must be formally 
deposed, and again whether the people must depose him 
for these reasons, or only may, it is not necessary to enter. 
Again, by the necessities of the case, the functions of 
this single ruler came in time to be discharged by a multi- 
tude of officials. The Caliphate was put into commission; 
but each official acted by delegated authority, and it is 
laid down as one of the responsibilities of the Caliph that 
he should personally satisfy himself that his deputies 
are doing their duty. Practically, the Caliph vanished 
behind a screen of administrative machinery and only a t  
crises of the state did the people have any contact with 
him. 
But though the successor of the Prophet, it is plain that 
the Caliph can only partially take the place of the Prophet. 
He cannot promulgate or define doctrines or laws; he can 
only defend and apply those already given forth and 
defined; in a word, he can only administer what is accepted 
as being of Islam. But that does not mean that the sys- 
tem of Islam is unchangeably fixed; it is quite the contrary. 
There are far greater possibilities of addition, development, 
and change inherent in the Moslem people than, for 
example, in the Pope, even when speaking ex cathedra. 
If that people agrees that any doctrine or law is of Islam, 
it is of Islam. This is the principle of the Agreement, and 
is crystallized in a saying put into the mouth of the 
Prophet: “My People will never agree in an error.” Fur- 
ther, this Agreement is not reached by any specific deci- 
sions of councils. The Moslem people, rather, develops it, 
as it  were, unconsciously through a process of gradual 
crystallizing of opinion. Individuals who by study and 
attainments have a right to have an opinion of their own 
on the point in question come to have the same opinion, 
and the thing is accomplished. This, of course, takes place 
everywhere in the formation of common opinion; but in 
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Islam it has been observed, analyzed, and established 
as a definitive source-and the final one-of theology and 
law. 
So much it is necessary to state to clear away the prev- 
alent view that the Caliph is a Pope. He is an executive 
and his business is to administer all the affairs of Islam, 
religious and secular, and to watch over the purity of its 
doctrine and usage. But it may well be asked how this 
theory can be brought into agreement with the historical 
facts, and, especially, with the existence of hereditary 
dynasties of Caliphs, such as the ‘Abbasids. The basis for 
these lies in the admitted right of the Caliph to nominate 
his successor; so Abii Bakr nominated ‘Umar, and the 
nomination was accepted. On the detailed theoretical 
limitations with which the canonists have surrounded this 
right of nomination they themselves are in dispute, and a 
consideration of them would lead us too far; in practice 
they have been ignored, Apart from the hereditary 
dynasties, the most conspicuous case of nomination is that 
which passed on the Caliphate to the Ottoman House. 
In 1538 the last representative of the ‘Abbasids died in 
Egypt as a purely titular Caliph, and he nominated as his 
successor Suleimiin the Great, the Sultan of the Ottoman 
Turks. Since then that sultan has received, a t  his ac- 
cession, a double investiture. He is girded with the sword 
of ‘Othmiin as the Sultan of the Ottomans, and he is chosen 
by the Sheikh al-Isliim, the official head of all the canonist- 
theologians of Turkey since that office mas created in 1453, 
as the Caliph of the Prophet, the head of the Moslem 
world, and symbolic representative of its theoretical unity. 
This action of the Sheikh al-Isliim is regarded as being 
that of the Moslem people; he, as it were, casts a ballot 
for them, a far more regular and legal proceeding than 
the violent scenes which so often took place in the 
stormy times of thelater ‘Abbiisids, when the mob of the 
capital, or even the palace guard, assumed the same 
function. 
But it becomes plain how theoretical is that unity when 
we consider that it existed only for 138 years, and that 
since A.D. 755 the Moslem world has never acknowledged 
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allegiance to a single ruler. . Somewhat later, in the tenth 
century, as Stanley Lane-hole has picturesquely put it, 
“ the Mediterranean washed the territories of three rival 
Caliphs.” Indeed, if we take account of more fugitive 
and less important secessions, we might push the period 
of unity back to within thirty years of the death of the 
Prophet. So many Moslems have felt, and their position 
has been put in the form of a statement from Mohammed, 
“ My Successorship will last thirty years; thereafter will 
come kings and princes.” 
This was one-a violent-method of evading the diffi- 
culty. Another was to develop the doctrine that when 
there were lands of Islam so far removed from the country 
of the Caliph that his influence and authority could not 
reach to them, it was allowable for the people of those 
lands to choose a Caliph of their own. This was upheld 
by canonists of the first rank in both east and west, and 
especiqlly, apparently, in the west. Spain was too far 
from Bagdad for the‘Abb8sid Caliphto be there more than 
a name. So, in 929, ‘Abd ar-Ralimiin 111, the Umayyad 
of Cordova, took the title of Caliph with the approval of 
the canonists of his court who urged this theory. 
It would be vain in the space possible here to work 
through the history of the Caliphate; but the resultant 
present situation can be put quite shortly. Moslems to- 
day look to, roughly, six different supreme rulers. By far 
the largest number render an allegiance, often dubious, to 
the Ottoman Sultan. On a basis of strict canon law his 
claim to that allegiance is shaky; for almost all Islam ac- 
cepts as valid a statement put into the mouth of Moham- 
med that the Caliph must be of the tribe of Quraish, that 
of the Prophet himself. ‘Abd al-Hamid, the late deposed 
Sultan, felt the force of this so strongly that the tradition 
in question had to be omitted in collections of traditions 
printed a t  Constantinople. The true basis of the Otto- 
man claim is really pragmatic. That Sultan is undoubt- 
edly the greatest independent ruler in the Moslem world, 
and to him, therefore, the headship belongs by right,. 
This basis would, of course, vanish with the vanishing or 
considerable curtailment of Turkey. 
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Afghanistan is probably the next greatest independent 
Moslem country. But its origin is comparatively modern 
dating from about the middle of the eighteenth century, 
and its Amir, although in treaties he is now a “majesty,” 
is debarred by treaty from external political relationships, 
and has never been associated with aspiration to the 
Caliphate. 
The second of the six is the Invisible Imiim of the 
Twelver sect of Shi‘ites. All Shi‘ites believe that ‘Ali the 
cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet and the fourth 
Caliph of the Sunnites, was his divinely appointed im- 
mediate successor and was wrongfully kept from his rights 
by his three predecessors; further, that his children had an 
equally divine right to succession after him. This is one 
of the legitimist parties in Islam, as opposed to the Sun- 
nite or democratic party, and Shi‘ ism has sometimes run 
perilously close to deifying the line of ‘Ali. All Persia 
believes that the twelfth in descent from ‘Ali was removed 
by Allah from the sight of men and is now being preserved 
dive in retirement until his time to reappear shall come. 
This withdrawal happened about A.D. 874, and still, for 
Persians, after more than a thousand years,heis al-Munta- 
zar, “ the awaited one,” and the real head of their govern- 
ment, and for them the Shfih is only a locum fenens to keep 
public order and no successor of the Prophet. This 
Invisible Imiim is believed also to control the destinies of 
his people by mysterious channels. Thus his headship is 
statedly maintained in the recent Persian Constitution, 
and the success of the revolution, now become so problem- 
atical, is ascribed to his influence. Another division of 
Shi‘ites took up the fortunes of another vanished Imiim, 
Ismii‘il, the seventh from Ali. These founded the Fiiti- 
mid dynasty in north Africa, which has long gone its way, 
but has left behind it two still existing, if minor and partly 
secret sects. One of these is the Druzes, now in revolt 
and holding their Mountain against the Turkish-German 
control of Syria. They worship, as a divine incarnation, 
al-Hakim, the tenth Fiitimid, who vanished in the Muqat- 
tam hills on the night of February 13, 1091 A.D., and 
left a mystery unread to this day. The other sect is the 
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Ismii'ilites, the Assassins of the Crusaders, who knew 
their head as the Old Manof theMountain. Their present 
head is the Agii Khiin, a peaceful Indian gentleman to 
whom has been granted a sovereign salute of guns by the 
English Government and who is well known in London 
drawing-rooms. There it would be hard to realize that 
his revenues are derived from the hereditary devotion of 
the Assassins, whose secret remnants in Syria still worship 
him as divine. He is said to have dreams of the Cali- 
phate; so John of Leyden might have dreamed of being 
elected Pope. 
Another legitimist party in Islam limits the right to the 
Caliphate to the descendants of the Prophet, who are 
called Sharifs, Nobles. This party differs from the one 
above in that it is mostly Sunnite in theology and law, 
and while some sections of it ascribe hereditary saintship 
to the prophetic line with a power of working miracles, 
there is no taint among them of incarnation doctrines. 
Their attitude is a development of the general Moslem 
respect for the family of Mohammed, which enjoys, indeed 
the only exception of prestige of birth in the democracy of 
Islam. In the Yemen there are the Zaidites, tending 
towards the Shi'ites in law and theology and obeying an 
Imam of their own who traces his descent from a certain 
Zaid, a great-great-grandson of the Prophet. In Morocco, 
too, the present reigning house, which, under the French 
protectorate, reigns but does not rule, is of the blood of the 
Prophet, and has for almost four centuries claimed the 
title of Commander of the Faithful. To them the sum- 
mons of the Ottoman Sultan to come to the assistance of 
their Caliph can have had no meaning. At  Mecca there 
are at least two Sharif families which have for centuries 
enjoyed the highest respect from all the Moslem world. 
They have never ventured openly to claim the Caliphate, 
because they have always been under control from with- 
out and were until their recent revolt under that of the 
Ottoman Turks. But with the Turkish garrison now 
removed, there is little question that they will sooner or 
later, elect a Caliph of their own; they may, therefore, 
well be entered here. 
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The last group of claimants of independent sovereignty 
may be described as puritan and nonconformist. Their 
descent is to be traced from primitive Moslems who 
seceded from the general body of Islam because of its 
decadence from the democratic simplicity and theological 
rigidity of the first generations. In  consequence they are 
completely outside of that general body; they regard other 
Moslems as renegades and worse than unbelievers, and the 
other Moslems regard them as stranger and less of kin to 
themselves than even Christians or Jews. These have 
never recognized any fundamental need of a Caliph. A 
head, for them, is allowable and useful, but is not the cen- 
tre of the organization of the whole state as in the rest of 
Islam. Their ideal, rather, goes back to the primitive 
tribe of the desert, with its rulers who possess only in- 
fluence over a democracy of individuals. Naturally, they 
are not found except in out-of-the-way corners of the 
Moslem world. The Ibadites have had their Imams at  
‘Oman, at the entrance of the Persian Gulf, since 751 A.D., 
and a branch from there has been long settled at Zanzibar 
and ruled by Sultans. They have smaller settlements, too, 
in southern Algeria. Somewhat akin to these primitive 
seceders, but of a later origin by reform, accepted within 
the unity of Islam, are the Wahhiibites of central Arabia. 
Here, too, may perhaps be entered the Sentissite fraternity 
of dervishes, for its policy has been to hold itself independ- 
ent of control on the part of the governments of the 
countries in which it exists. For this reason it has stead- 
ily withdrawn its central organization deeper and deeper 
into the deserts of the Sahara, until it is now seated on the 
northern shore of Lake Chad. It is thus an imperium in 
imperio in the Moslem world. It avoids, too, all entan- 
gling contacts with unbelievers, and the story runs that its 
head formally “excommunicated” ‘Abd al-Hamid for his too 
much such trdcking. This probably means that he threw 
off allegiance to him as Caliph. By this time he has prob- 
ably heartily repented his recent union with the Turks and 
has fallen back again into his solitude and independence. 
These, then, are the elements, great and small, in the 
problem of the future of the Caliphate. The ill success 
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which has attended the summons addressed to the Mos- 
lem world by the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph has shown that 
the principle of unity in Islam is fast yielding to that of 
nationality. And that means that Islam is becoming 
more of a simple religion and less of a political system. 
But the indications are that this religious unity, also, for 
the great mass of Sunnites a t  least, will tend to express 
itself symbolically through an individual figure. The 
legitimists, Shi'ite and Sunnite, and the primitive Mos- 
lems, being already provided with heads or rejecting such 
headship as unessential, will, of course, have nothing to do 
with any such attempt. Further, this will be a matter for 
Moslems to work out for themselves by agreement and 
disagreement. They will certainly, however, desire that 
such a head shall be independent of external entanglements, 
especially with non-Moslems. It is, therefore, not sur- 
prising that one of the drifts of Moslem thought is towards 
setting apart Mecca and Medina, with their surrounding 
territory, as a kind of Estates of the Church, neutral and 
inviolable, and towards choosing as Caliph the head of the 
Sharif families there. Certainly, if a purely spiritual 
Caliph is to reside a t  any one point, it should be at  Mecca, 
the religious centre of Islam. And it would be only nat- 
ural that he should be chosen from among the descendants 
of the founder of that faith. To gain such a position the 
new King of the Hijiiz must demonstrate that he is 
strong enough to maintain standing as an independent 
monarch-any suspicion of being " protected" would be 
fatal-and that he can keep such order as to make the 
pilgrimage to Mecca and the visit to Medina safe for all 
Moslems. Then the Moslem world on pragmatic grounds 
might accept his legally perfect claim to the Caliphate. 
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